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BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED
TO SEPARATE TRUST DEPARTMENTS
FROM LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKS
Thomas J. Schoenbaum*

Commercial banks are undergoing a period of fundamental
change. During the past fifteen years, larger banks have joined the
general trend toward diversification and growth by expanding into
many nonbanking areas as well as by extending their operations
into regional, national, and foreign markets. They have developed
holding company structures that have aggressively sought bank
mergers and acquisitions. In addition to their traditional role as
depository institutions and suppliers and allocators of short term
credit to commerce and industry, banks also have become heavily
engaged in mortgage banking, consumer credit, management of
real estate investment trusts, and many other businesses. 1
The movement toward diversification and growth has, however,
been called into question. The 1973-1974 recession came at a time
when many commercial banks had overextended their financial
resources. In many cases this was due to interest-free loans to
unprofitable nonbank subsidiaries. Several large banks failed, and
many more were placed on "problem" lists by regulatory authorities. 2 Disclosure of this has helped to undermine the public's
confidence in the nation's banking industry.
Events such as these, as well as the recent "credit crunch,"
have generated attempts to reform financial institutions. Congress
is considering legislation to consolidate the tripartite system of
federal bank regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A., 1961, St. Joseph's College; J .D.,
1965, University of Michigan.
,
I am grateful to my research assistant, H. M. "Buzz''. Burwell, J.D., University of North
Carolina, 1976, for his help and counsel.
1 Under the Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, one-bank holding companies,
which previously had been virtually exempt from restrictions with respect to the acquisition
of companies engaged in nonbanking activities, were subjected to the same restrictions as
multibank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850, 1971-1978 (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 225
(1976). Bank mergers are regulated under the Bank Merger Act of 1960 as amended in 1966.
12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1970). Bank regulatory agencies have been quite permissive, however, in
the regulation of bank mergers and holding company activity. See Reid, Legislation, Regulation, Antitrust, and Bank Mergers, 92 BANKING L.J. 6, 28-29 (1975).
2 See, e.g., Citibank, Chase Manhattan on U.S. 'Problem List,' Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1976,
at I, col. I; Holding-Firm Concept Turns Sour for Banks as Profits Fall Short, Wall St. J .,
Apr. 20, 1976, at_ I, col. 6.
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ation into a Federal Banking Commission 3 because of an alleged
"race of laxity" between the different regulatory agencies, exacerbated by attempts of banks to choose their regulators. 4 In an effort
to remove restrictions on competition among financial institutions
and to increase the supply of credit, legislation has been proposed
to permit thrift institutions, savings and loan associations, savings
banks, and credit unions to offer checking account services and to
allow the payment of interest on checking account deposits. Thrift
institutions would be granted the power to make consumer loans,
invest in debt securities, and handle trust accounts; commercial
banks would be given increased incentives for home mortgage
lending. 5 In addition, Congress and the SEC are considering
whether to compel increased disclosure by banks and bank holding
companies. 6
The recent financial and regulatory stresses have caused many
commercial banks to rethink their involvement in nonbanking
areas of business. Increasingly, they are divesting themselves of
their nonbanking subsidiaries in order to concentrate on more

3 S. 2298, 94th Cong., fst Sess. (1975). This bill was introduced by Senator Proxmire and
was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 121 CoNG.
REc. 15374 (1975). Similar legislation is being considered in the House of Representatives.
See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (FINE) DISCUSSION PRINCIPLES,
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FINE REPORT]. These proposals have a long
history, beginning with the U.S. PRESIDENT'S CoMM. ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE REGULATION, REPORT at iii (1972), which is commonly known as the Hunt Comm. Report, after its
chairman, Reed 0. Hunt. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AcT OF 1975, s. Rpt. No. 94-487, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
At this writing, the prospect for passage of a far-reaching reform bill appears to have
dimmed, especially in the House. See Bank Lobby Cashes in on Grass-Roots Power to Sway
Legislators, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at I, col. 6; House Democrats in Retreat on Overhaul
of Bank Laws, Split Proposal into 3 Bills, Wall St. J., Mar. 3 I, 1976, at 3, col. 2; WateredDown Measure to Revise the Fed Further Weakened, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1976, at 6, col. 2.
•For a case study of such attempts, see Changing Charters, Did the Bank Switch Rather
Than Fight the Fed Examiners?, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1976, at I, col. 6.
5 S. 1267, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill is subtitled: An Act to Expand Competition, Provide Improved Consumer Services, Strengthen the Ability of Financial Institutions
to Adjust to Changing Economic Conditions, and Improve the Flow of Funds for Mortgage
Credit. Analogous legislation is being considered by the House Banking Committee. See
FINE REPORT, supra note 3. This legislation also grew out of the Hunt Comm. Report, supra
note 3.
6 These disclosure proposals have been made in the wake of the fact that several large
banks are on the "watch list" of the Comptroller of the Currency. Unlike the SEC, bank
regulatory agencies consider disclosure of financial instability of banks as needlessly
exacerbating concern over the nation's banking system. Fed Aide Sees Problem-Bank
Disclosures Spurring Needless Concern Over System, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, I 976, at 6, col. 2.
Like other corporations, banks are subject to the registration and continuous disclosure
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U .S.C. § 781 (1970), but§ 12(i), 15
U .S.C. § 78I(i) vests enforcement jurisdiction in the bank regulatory agencies and imposes
substantially fewer requirements on banks than the SEC imposes on other corporations. See
Mann, Securities Disclosure Requirements-Vive La Difference, 92 BANKING L.J. 109
(1975). See also Rising Disclosures About Problem Banks May Erode Confidence, Wall St.
J., Jan. 23, 1976, at 26, col. I.
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traditional concerns. 7 At the same time, however, banks are considering the possibilities of expanded services to their traditional
customers, which would involve not only taking deposits and making short and medium term loans, but also "merchant banking"offering a full range of money management and financial services to
business and individual customers. 8 Thus, it appears that banks
will become increasingly involved in securities activities such as
arranging private placements of securities, providing agency and
investment services to give customers more cqnvenient access to
the securities markets, and offering financial advisory services. 9
As this trend continues, new questions of public policy must be
examined. What will be the impact of these activities on the investment banking community and financial markets? How valid
are the restrictions of the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall
Act), 10 which have limited the entry of banks into the securities
business? Are new regulatory structures needed? This article (1)
analyzes the traditional Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on banks
and the leading case of Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 11
where the Supreme Court held that the offering by commercial
banks of commingled agency accounts violated the Glass-Steagall
Act prohibition against underwriting securities, (2) considers the.
developments since that decision, and (3) offers suggestions on an
approach to devising solutions to the policy questions involved.

I. GLASS-STEAGALL ACT RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS
AND INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE V. CAMP
A.

The Basic Statutory Restrictions

The Glass-Steagall Act is the principal law determining the extent to which banks may engage in securities activities. Passed in
response to the 1929 stock market collapse, the Act is directed
toward specific abuses perceived at that time in the operation by
commercial banks of affiliates which engaged in underwriting securities. The commerical banks often abused their loan powers by
financing for their customers the purchase of securities underwritten by affiliates, by making loans to affiliates to finance their
underwriting activities, and by making loans to corporations who
1See Commercial Banks Seek More Business From 'Individual Depositors, Borrowers,
Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1975, at 16, col. 1; Holding Firm Concept Turns Sour for Banks as
Profits Fall Short, Wall St. J ., Apr. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
8Merchant Banking, Is the U.S. Ready For It? Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at 54.
9 /d.
10 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 StaL 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
11 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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agreed to use bank affiliates as underwriters. 12 These abuses compromised bank loan policies, caused banks to take undue risks,
increased speculation in securities, and contributed significantly to
the widespread failures of commercial banks . 13
Congress considered and rejected regulation of bank securities'
affiliates and, in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, chose the extreme
solution of completely divorcing investment banking from commercial banking. 14 Under sections 1615 and 20 16 of the Act, neither
national banks 17 nor their affiliates may engage in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities. Section
2l1 8 prohibits corporations in the business of issuing, selling, or
underwriting securities from engaging in commercial banking. Finally, to prevent interlocks of directors or employees, section 32 19
provides that no officer, director, or employee of a business
primarily engaged in the underwriting or distribution of securities
may be an officer or director of a member bank of the Federal
Reserve System.
This separation of functions did not, however, totally exclude
commercial banks from securities activities. A 1935 amendment to
section 16 expressly permits banks to deal in securities to the
extent. of purchasing and selling them upon the order of and for the
account of their customers. 20 In addition, the limitations of section
16 are expressly inapplicable to commercial banks' underwriting of
obligations of the United States and of general revenue bonds of
state and local govemments.21 Moreover, banks are permitted to
purchase investment securities for their own account, subject to
the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency. 22 Thus, in
addition to having important functions as underwriters of federal,
state, and municipal bonds, banks may buy and sell securities on
behalf of customers and for their own account.
Banks buy and sell securities on behalf of customers through the
operations of their trust departments. The Federal Reserve Act
granted trust department powers to National Banks in 1913, 23 and
12Operatioil of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings Be/ore a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. 71, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess., Pt. I at 1058, 1063-64 (1931).
1375 CONG. REc. 9911-12 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley).
14See 75 CONG. REc. 9888 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass).
15 12 u.s.c. § 24 (1970).
16 12 u .s.c. § 377 (1970).
17 Under 12 U .S.C. § 335 (1970), state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System are subject to the same prohibitions as national banks with respect to dealings in
securities.
18 12 u.s.c. § 378 (1970).
1 •12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
20 Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 308(a), 49 Stat. 709 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970)).
21 12 u .s.c. § 24 (1970).
22 /d. The applicable regulations may be found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.410 (1976).
23 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6., § 11, 38 Stat. 262 (1913).
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the Glass-Steagall Act left these powers intact. Pursuant to this
authority, banks give investment advice to individual investors by
managing agency accounts. In addition, for many years, banks
have managed common trust funds for assets entrusted to them in
their fiduciary capacities as trustees, executors, administrators,
and guardians. 24 These activities have enjoyed a remarkable
growth stemming to a considerable extent from the act of Congress
which in 1962 transferred regulatory jurisdiction of the fiduciary
activities of national banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the
Comptroller of the Currency. 25 At the end of 1974, the assets of
commercial bank trust departments totaled $328 billion, and their
stock holdings, measured in terms of market value, reached 27
percent of total stock outstanding. 26 Much of this growth is attributable to banks' management of pension, profit-sharing, and
other tax benefited plans in common trust funds. 27
B.

Investment Company Institute v. Camp

In 1971, in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 28 the Supreme Court of the United States faced what it called the "novel
and substantial" questions raised under the Glass-Steagall Act
concerning the extent to which commercial banks may engage in
securities-related activities. The case involved a challenge brought
by the Investment Company Institute, a trade association of open
end investment companies, 29 to Regulation 9, 30 issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency. Regulation 9 authorized for the first
time the commingling of managing agency accounts as within national banks' fiduciary powers under section 92a of the Federal
24 The fiduciary powers of national banks are governed by regulations promulgated by"the
Comptroller of the Currency.12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9. 104 (1976).
25 Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668 (12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970). For an account of the
development of bank common trust funds, see Saxon and Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53
GEO. L.J. 994 (1965).

26 Hearings on the Expansion of Commercial Banks' Securities Business Operations and
the Elimination of Barriers Between the Banking and Securities Industries Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94.th
Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Securities Subcomm. Hearings] (statement

of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities Exchange Commission). This figure was estimated to be $400 billion as of November I, 1975. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC
POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES, AN ISSUES PAPER 7 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, reprinted in Securities Subcomm. Hearings
22-59].
27 E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS 17-18
(1975) ..
28 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
"'This type of investment company (commonly called a mutual fund) generally issues only
redeemable stock which it stands ready at all times to redeem at an amount equal to the net
asset value of its investment portfolio. See R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES
REGULATION 1441-42 (3d ed. 1972).
30 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1976).
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Reserve Act of 1913. 31 First National City Bank (Citibank) had
attempted to take advantage of this authorization by establishing a
plan to accept deposits of a minimum of $10,000 and to invest the
funds together with those of other participants. Commingling was
an essential part of Citibank's plan, because only through the
economies of scale gained by collective management was it
economically feasible to make such an offer. Citibank's intention
was to use this plan to make available to the "small" investor the
same investment management services that it traditionally offered
to its wealthy customers. Although the depositor was a principal
and the bank a managing agent, the account was the functional
equivalent of a mutual fund, since each customer obtained an
undivided interest in the fund (expressed as a "unit of participation") which was redeemable at net asset value. Accordingly, the
account was registered as an Investment Company under the Investment Company Act, 32 and the units of participation were registered as securities under the Securities Act of 1933. 33
The Supreme Court framed the issues involved in Camp in terms
of whether the operation of this type of investment fund involves a
bank in "underwriting" the sale of "securities" under the GlassSteagall Act. 34 Although the terms "security" and "underwriter"
had been interpreted in many different contexts under the securities law, the court of appeals, in considering this same question, had stated that the judicial gloss on these definitions in the
securities acts could not be imported wholesale into the GlassSteagall Act because the laws serve different purposes. 35 The
Supreme Court implicitly agreed with this position, in holding that
the participations in the commingled investment account were
_securities involving the bank in illegal underwriting relying, not
Ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 262 (12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970)).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52. (1970). Pursuant to its authority under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c)
(1970), the SEC granted the account an exemption from 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l0 (1970) which
permitted three members of the account's five member investment committee to be persons
affiliated with Citibank. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASO) brought
suit to challenge this exemption and this case was consolidated with Camp. The court of
appeals upheld the validity of the exemption, National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420
F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as NASO v. SEC]. In reviewing the consolidated
cases, the Supreme Court did not reach the Investment Company Act exemption issue, but
vacated the NASO v. SEC opinion on the same grounds as the Camp case.
33 15 U .S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Citibank was concededly a statutory
underwriter under the Securities Act of 1933 for the units of participation issued. The
defendants relied upon and the court of appeals accepted the "two entity" theory that the
account is an entity separate from the bank. NASO v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Therefore it did not enjoy the bank's exemption but was a nonexempt investment company
and a nonexempt issuer of a security subject to regulation. Although the bank was an
underwriter of a security under the definition of those terms in the Securities Act, it was not
an underwriter within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act.
34 401 U.S. at 634-35.
35 420 F.2d 83, 89. The court of appeals' decision in Camp is reported under the name of its
companion case. See note 32 supra.
31

32
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upon the well-kn9wn line of decisions under the securities acts, 36
but upon the purposes and policies of the Glass-Steagall Act. 37
Considering ·the policies of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Court
found three hazards in the sale of units of participation in a commingled investment account that are not present when a bank,
following traditional practices, undertakes to purchase stock for
the account of its individual customers or to commingle assets that
it has received as a fiduciary in a trust account. First, losses on a
commingled investment account could endanger public confidence
in the bank itself. Second, promotional incentives to market the
units of participation aggressively make it impossible for the bank
to give disinterested investment advice in its role as a fiduciary.
Third, the managing of the account could tempt the bank to make
unsound loans to customers for the purpose of participating in the
account or to companies in whose stocks the account was invested. 38 The Court interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act as permitting banks to operate a collective investment fund for the investment of funds held for a "true fiduciary purpose," but as prohibiting them from commingling assets which it has received for investment. 39
Further analysis, however, reveals that none of the problems the
Court cites are unique to commingled investment accounts as
opposed to traditional agency or common trust funds. No special
danger exists that losses on a commingled investment account
would deplete bank depositors' money, because the securities purchased are only for the account of participants in the fund. Neither
is there any unique problem that portfolio losses would cause
diminished public confidence in banks. Through their trust departments, banks already hold significant stock positions in
portfolio companies. The Patman Report of 1968 found that the
forty-nine largest trust banks held more than 5 percent of the stock
of 145 of the 500 largest industrial corporations, and that these
holdings were often accompanied by director interlocks. 40 In some
industries, such as the airlines industry, banks, through their trust
departments, have been particularly dominant. 41
The argument that special promotional incentives exist to market
the fund that would interfere with the ability of banks to offer
36 The two leading Supreme Court cases on the definition of a security under the securities
acts are still SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), and SEC v. W.J.
Aowey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement, see
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
37 401 U.S. at 623-34.
38/d. at 636-38.
39/d. at 638.
40 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CUR·
RENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., I COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES:
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY Ch. 3 (Comm. Print. 1968).
41 /d. at 484-85.

[VOL. 10: 1

Journal of Law Reform

8

disinterested financial advice is also not convincing. Banks have
promoted their trust services aggressively, regarding them not only
as directly profitable but also as sources of other loan and deposit
business. 42 The possibility of distortion of loan policy is inherent in
trust department activities and is a source of continuing concern. 43
The Court's holding that a commingled investment fund involves
a bank in underwriting a "security" under the Glass-Steagall Act
thus cannot be supported by the distinction between the sale of
fiduciary services and the sale of investments. But the Court advanced another reason for its holding. Conceding that the three
powers that would be used in marketing the account-pooling trust
assets, acting as managing agent for individual customers, and
purchasing stock for the account of its customers-were within a
banks' powers under the banking laws, the Court nevertheless
found that "the union of these powers gives birth to an investment
fund whose activities are of a different character. " 44 Thus, the
Court reasoned, that because the investment fund created was
indisputably in direct competition with the mutual fund industry,
and because the selling of mutual fund shares is undeniably the
issuance of a security, the bank investment fund must also be a
security. 45
The difficulty with this analysis is that the Court abandons the
idea, which it had implicity accepted, that there may be a distinction between the ways the terms "security" and "1.mderwriting"
are used in the Glass-Steagall Act and in the securities laws. By
adopting the test of "direct competition" with mutual funds, the
Court is judging the bank investment fund by the securities acts
and investment company act
. standards. It had, of course, been
conceded by the banks that their fund was a "security" under
the Securities Act of 1933 and an "investment company" under the
Investment Company Act of 1940. 46 However, the Court ignores
the possibility that an interest may be a security under the 1933 and
1934 securities acts and the account may be an investment c9mpany, without involving the bank in the underwriting of a security
under the Glass-Steagall Act. 47 Because of the breadth of the
judicial holdings relating to the definition of a security under the

.

E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 16.
/d. at 16-17.
44 401 U.S. at 624-25.
45 /d. at 625.
46 See note 33 supra.
47 Unlike the two securities acts, the Glass-Steagall Act does not define the term."security."
42

43
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securities acts, the Glass-Steagall Act would become unworkable if
these doctrines were imported into it wholesale. 48
The use of the "direct competition" test nevertheless permeates
the entire Supreme Court opinion in the Camp case. 49 The result is
a compartmentalized view of the activities of commercial banks
and other investment vehicles that does not comport with reality
and that incorrectly interprets the Glass-Steagall Act as embodying
a policy of prohibiting direct competition between banks and the
investment company and securities industries. In addition, the test
used for the definition of "security" and "underwriting" under the
Glass-Steagall Act gives no firm guidance as to how lower courts
and agencies such as the SEC should treat banks' securities-related
activities in the future. The irony of the Court's opinion is that it
substantially increases the difficulty of sorting out forays by banks
into the investment and securities business. This has become clear
in the aftermath of the Camp decision.

II.

THE AFfERMATH OF

INVESTMENT COMPANY

INSTITUTE V. CAMP
A.

Newer Forms of Bank Securities-Related
Activllies

Despite the Supreme Court's unwarranted view in Camp that the
policy of the Glass-Steagall Act is to prohibit banks from direct
competition with the investment company and securities industries, commercial banks have increased their securities-related activities in the years since the decision. These activities can be
divided into three general categories. First, banks offer their customers many agency securities services in which they act as intermediaries between the customer and the broker-dealer commun48 The definition of a ''security'' under the securities laws has been construed to cover any
instrument whose economic impact is the use of money of passive investors on the promise
of profits. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 844 (1975). Thus, in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), withdrawable capital shares in a state-chartered
savings and loan association were held to be securities. Moreover, the definition has been
construed to cover certain trust department activities of banks. Local 734 Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., (1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),r 94,
565 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972);
Carroll v. First Nat'! Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert', denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
It has also been held applicable to revocable inter vivos trusts sold by a trust company where
the trustee had unlimited investment discretion and the investor was assured a return. SEC
V. Heritage Trust Co., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 95,282
(W.D. Ariz. 1976).
49 401 U.S. ,\T 625, 635, 638.
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ity .50 These services go beyond the traditional custodial account in
which the customer deposits his portfolio for safekeeping and the
bank distributes the dividends or buys and sells securities at the
customer's direction. Many banks offer an individual portfolio
management plan under which the customer instructs the bank to
make purchases or sales of securities with the aid of recommendations by the bank or a correspondent broker-dealer. 51 Also
available are dividend reinvestment plans under which the customer may request a corporation to pay all his dividends to a bank
which aggregates them and purchases additional shares of the
corporation's common stock. 52 The newest type of agency securities service is the automatic investment service (AIS) under
which the bank deducts an amount from a bank customer's checking account monthly and invests it in common stock of issuers
selected by the customer from a list of the twenty-five largest
corporations based upon the market value of outstanding stock.
The bank pools the monthly deductions from each participant for
the purpose of executing the transactions, but each month the
customer receives a statement indicating the number of full and
fractional shares purchased on his behalf. 53
Second, banks are heavily engaged in securities activities
through their offering of two different types of money-management
collective investment funds. A common trust fund can be maintained for the investment of moneys managed by the bank in its
capacity as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian. Banks
can also set up collective investment funds consisting solely of
assets of retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other
tax benefited plans. 54 In addition, since 1972 banks have been

50 Because the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks from acting as underwriters or dealers
but permits agency securities activities, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), it is arguable that banks could
operate a retail brokerage business for customers. Banks have not chosen to test this
proposition, however, presumably for economic reasons.
5 'Commercial banks have typically offered these services to wealthy investors who can
afford the minimum account, typically $200,000 or more. In recent years the minimum
account size has been lowered to as little as $10,000. No pooling of the accounts takes place,
and transactions are not executed by the bank without prior approval of the customer.
Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 97 (written comments of the SEC). Banks
generally do not accept discretionary investment accounts because of the securities law
implications. See text accompanying note 88 infra. The Camp case, of course, prevents the
commingling of these accounts. See note 39 and accompanying_ text supra.
52 These plans have enjoyed remarkable growth in the last five years. Securities Subcomm.
Hearing, supra note 26, at 94.
53 1n 1974, about twenty-five commercial banks offered an AIS plan. Id. at 96-97.
54 12 C.F.R. § 9. 18 (1975). These collective funds are permitted even after Camp because of
their fiduciary purpose. As of November, 1975, the nation's commercial banks were handling approximately $400 billion in trust assets. Of this, $150 billion represented pension funds
and other assets of institutional customers; the remainder was being managed for private
individuals. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, supra note 26, at 7, reprinted in
Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 3L
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authorized to serve as investment advisors to both open end and
closed end investment companies; they may even sponsor, organize, and control closed end investment companies. 55
Third, banks offer corporate customers financial consulting services. This involves complete analysis of long term financing objectives and alternatives. Where appropriate, they grant long or
medium term loans, arrange a private placement of the corporation's securities, and assist in dealing with an investment banker to
carry out a public offering. 56 In this area, banks are in direct
competition with investment bankers despite the fact that the
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits them from underwriting and dealing in
securities except for United States Government bonds and general
obligation bonds of state and local governments. 57

B.

The Counter-Attack of the Investment
Company Industry

The Investment Company Institute, the trade association of
open end investment companies that was the plaintiff in Camp, has
brought two separate actions in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief
against two of the above-mentioned bank securities activities. In
the first case, the Institute challenged, as an infringement of sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, that part of the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation Y which permits banks to act as investment advisors of mutual funds. 58 However, the action was
dismissed on procedural grounds without resolution. 59 The second
55 12 C.F.R. §§ 22f4(a), 225.125 (1976). In the opinion of the Federal Reserve Board, as
expressed in the regulations, a bank which sponsors, organizes, or controls a mutual fund
would violate the Glass-Steagall Act. Nonetheless, this is not true with respect to closed end
investment companies, because, unlike mutual funds, they do not continuously issue and
redeem their securities and are thus not primarily in the business of selling securities. 12
C.F.R § 225.125(0 (1976). For a discussion of these problems see Comment, Bank Sponsored Investment Services: Statutory Proscriptions, Jurisdictional Conflicts, and a Legislative Proposal, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 726, 789-92 (1975).
56 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, supra note 26, at 9, reprinted in Securities
Sucbomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 33. See also Bus. WEEK, supra note 8, at 54-55.
57 See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra. There is a separate debate over the
question of whether banks' underwriting powers should be broadened to include municipal
revenue bonds, which can be repaid only from specific revenues. Attempts by banks to enter
this field have been struck down by the courts. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F.
Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), affd sub. nom., Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392
F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For an argument that legislation should be enacted granting this
power to banks, see Mehle, Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue Bonds: Presen•ing
Free and Fair Competition, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117 (1975).
58 See note 55 supra.
59 ICI v. Board of Governors, No. 74-697 (D.D.C. filed May 8, 1974), dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction (July 30, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-1822 (D.C. Cir. Aug. I, 1975). For the
text of the complaint, see [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 94,540
(D.D.C. May 8, 1974).
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case, New York Stock Exchange & Investment Co. Institute v.
Smith, 60 involved a challenge to the ruling of the Comptroller of the
Currency that AIS services offered by national banks do not violate the Glass-Steagall Act. 61 The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that selling units of participation in the AIS plan does not constitute selling a security by an
affiliate under the Glass-Steagall Act, and that the underlying securities transactions by banks are within the agency exception of
section 16. 62 The court distinguished Camp on the grounds that the
AIS offering does not create in the banks a salesman's interest in
the performance of the securities or threaten the bank's prestige
because they do not •·•manage" the customer's investments. The
banks' lending policies would not be affected because the corporations whose securities were involved are all "blue chip" companies and are solvent by definition. The court also found that
under an AIS, banks compete with investment brokers "only in
terms of convenience, cost and dependability" and that this presents no danger to bank solvency. 63
This analysis shows the difficulty of applying the Camp approach to the ever-changing kaleidoscope of new activities by
banks in this field. The courts are faced with judging each form of
securities-related activity on a case-by-case basis against the
policies of the Glass-Steagall Act. Furthermore, the result in Smith
is difficult to reconcile with the Camp decision. AIS plans are in
direct competition with similar plans provided by the investment
company industry, 64 and banks pool participants' funds for the
purpose of executing securities transactions just as in other investment funds. Yet the court ignored the Supreme Court's "direct
competition" test and disregarded the commingling of funds in a
nonfiduciary account. It is also difficult to accept the court's view
that a bank is totally indifferent to the performance of the twentyfive securities it selects for the plan. The court's narrow view of the
policy of the Glass-Steagall Act is quite subjective, and this ad hoc
approach to the resolution of the problem of what bank securities
activities are permissible is undesirable because it can only lead to
confusion and conflicting interpretations.

60 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975). The complaint is reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'ii 94,798 (D.D.C. 1975).
61 This ruling was contained in a letter, dated June 10, 1974, from the Comptroller of the
Currency to the attorney for the Investment Company Institute. For the relevant text, see
Glass-Steagall Act-A History of Its Legislative Origin and Regulatory Construction, 92
BANKING L.J. 38 (1975).
62 404 F. Supp. at 1097.
63 /d. at 1099-1100.
64 Securities Subcomm_. Hearings,. supra note 26, at 100 (written comments of the SEC).
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The Regulatory Response

I. The Bank Supervisory Agencies-Bank supervisory agencies
regulate and monitor bank fiduciary activities, including the traditional and newer forms of securities-related activities, through the
bank examination process. Because the national banks are most
active in this area, the primary regulatory responsibility falls on the
Comptroller of the Currency. 65 Applicable rules require an annual
trust department examination separate from the general bank examination.66 Investments must be examined to determine whether
they are in accordance with law and sound fiduciary principles. 67
The assets of each fiduciary account are required to be segregated
from the assets of the bank and either kept separate from those of
other accounts or otherwise adequately identified. 68
Bank supervisory agencies argue that the bank examination process can be adapted to provide adequate regulation of bank securities activities, 69 but there are several difficulties with this
proposition. First, there are substantial doubts whether trust department supervision has been adequate even with respect to traditional trust department investment activities, especially in the
areas of conflicts of interest, disclosure, and cash management. 70
Second, the Comptroller of the Currency, during the last decade,
has been in the forefront of advocating increased bank power to
engage in securities activities. In view of the "sense of constituency"71 of this and other bank regulatory agencies, it is doubtful
whether effective regulation by them is possible. Third, even if the
trust department supervision process is adequate for its purpose,
which is to assure that breaches of fiduciary duty will not endanger
the bank's solvency, this process does not seem well-suited to the
purpose of protecting investors. Furthermore, disclosure, the tra65 All national banks are examined by the Comptroller of the Currency, while state
chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System are examined by the
Federal Reserve Board. Federally insured state chartered banks are examined by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and noninsured banks are left to state regulatory
authorities.
66 Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 176 (letter of Comptroller of the
Currency to Subcomm. Chairman, Feb. 3, 1976).
67 12 C.F.R. § 9.ll(a) (1976).
68 12 C.F.R. § 9.13 (1976).
69 Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 168-70 (statement of the Comptroller
of the Currency). However, the Comptroller's Office leaves audit procedures of the newer
forms of bank securities activities, such as AIS, to the discretion of the individual examiner.
There is also no special scrutiny of bank investment advisor activities. Id. at 176. For a
defense of the adequacy of agency supervision over bank securities activities, see Comment,
The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1498-1504 (1975).
10See Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE
L.J. 977 (I 973).
71 The phrase is Professor Gerard T. Dumme's. Editor's Headnotes, 93 BANKING L.J. 387
(1976).
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ditional tool for protecting investors and safeguarding the allocative efficiency of the securities markets, is distrusted by the banking agencies. 72 Fourth, insofar as banks are effectively competing
with investment companies and securities dealers through the
evolving forms of bank securities activities, it seems unfair to
subject the banks to substantially different regulatory requirements, because this skews the competition between them.
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission:._The SEC, which
exercises regulatory jurisdiction over the securities and investment
company industries, has been unsure and inconsistent in its approach to the regulation of bank securities activities. Banks are
clearly subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities acts, 73
even with regard to transactions on behalf of their traditional trust
and custodial accounts. 74 The problem presented to the SEC in the
face of increasing bank securities activities is that the securities
laws contain broad exemptions for banks from the registration
requirements which are applicable to most other participants in the
securities markets. The Securities Act of 1933 exempts securities
issued or guaranteed by banks as well as participations in common
trust funds and most tax benefited single or collective trust funds. 75
The Securities Exchange Act exempts banks from the definitions
of "broker" and "dealer" 76 providing that the continuous reporting and proxy solicitation requirements applicable to banks are to
be administered by the appropriate federal bank regulatory agenSee note 6 supra.
The principal antifraud provisions are, of course, section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and Rule IOb-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240,
IOb-5 (1976). Also relevant is 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), which is the general antifraud provision
under the 1933 Securities Act.
74 See cases cited in note 48 supra. In a significant recent decision, a federal district court
held a nonvoluntary, noncontributory employee pension plan to be a "security" subject to
the federal securities laws, including the antifraud provisions. Daniel v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N .D. Ill. 1976).
75 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). This exemption applies to the registration requirements of
the 1933 Securities Act but does not extend to the antifraud sections. Moreover, the
exemption is not available if the plan provides that contributions are to be held in a single
trust fund maintained by a bank for a single employer and an .amount in excess of the
employer's contribution is allocated to securities issued by the employer. The exemption is
also not available to plans which cover self-employed individuals (H.R. 10 plans) within the
meaning of section 40l(c)(l) of the Internal Revenue Code, although the SEC can exempt
them by rule. Id. In addition, the SEC has interpreted the exemption to be unavailable
where a trustee bank acts as a mere custodian for a collective trust fund and does not have
investment discretion. In re Sterling Bank & Trust Co., [1976] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1)
80,433.
76 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1970). An important aspect of this exemption with respect to
newer forms of bank securities activities is that banks are not subject to any specific
"suitability" requirement which bars brokers from recommending securities unsuitable for
their customers. See Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 163 (response of
SEC). The Chairman of the SEC has recently stated that the SEC is considering whether to
interpret existing law to require that banks assure the suitability as investments of the
securities they purchase for customers. SEC Mulls Regulating Investment Plans of Banks
Competing with Broker Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
72

73
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cies 77 and including common trust fund interests and most tax
benefited plans in the definition of "exempted security. " 78 In
addition, the Investment Company Act of 1940 excludes banks,
trust companies, and common trust funds from the definition of
"investment company, " 79 and banks are not "investment advisors" as that term is defined under the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940. 80
The debate over the wisdom of these broad exclusions for banks
in the federal securities laws should focus on three separate issues:
(l) whether the bank supervisory agencies are capable of
adequately regulating disclosure on the issuance of new bank securities as well as the continuous reporting disclosure requirements, 81 (2) whether additional disclosure should be required of
bank trust department activities, particularly with respect to pension and other collective investment funds, 82 and (3) whether the
other exemptions, such as the exclusion from the definitions of
broker-dealer, investment company, and investment advisor, are
now outmoded because of the newer forms of bank securitiesrelated activities.
The first question has not yet been directly faced by the SEC,
and is a source of continuing controversy. 83 The second question is
the subject of an ongoing SEC study, 84 but any increased disclosure requirements are certain to be opposed by bank regulators.
The solution adopted by the SEC in response to the third question
is the "two entity" theory which holds that when a bank creates an
investment plan or fund going beyond any of the express exemptions of the acts, it has created a separate nonexempt entity that is
engaged in the issuance of securities. This entity is subject to
regulation because the account or fund is the issuer, rather than the

15 u.s.c. § 781(i) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l2) (1970). This has the effect of an exemption from all of the
requirements of the Act except the antifraud provisions. Single and collective trust funds
maintained by a bank for self-employed individuals (H.R. 10 plans) are not included in the
definition of exempted security, but are specifically exempt from the registration provisions
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(H) (1970).
79 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3), (11) (1970).
80 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1970). However, banks that are advisors for registered investment companies are not exempt from the provisions of the Investment Company Act that
pertain to investment advisors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1970).
81 Under their general power of supervision over banks, the bank supervisory agencies
adopted disclosure requirements for offering circulars of new issues of bank securities,
analogous to 1933 Securities Act regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 16.1-.6 (1976). New issues by
bank holding companies are subject to SEC jurisdiction.
82 For a review of current proposals in this area, ~ee Lybecker, supra note 70, at 998-1001.
83 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 6; Butera, Bank Exemption from the 1933 Securities Act, 93
BANKING L.J. 432 (1976).
84 See SEC Swdies Easing of Mwual Fund Reins, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
77
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bank, which is exempt. 85 This was the theory applied by the SEC
to the commingled fund in Camp. 86 The decision of the Supreme
Court, however, left open for definitive resolution the question of
the viability of the "two entity" approach, and did not provide the
SEC with any guidance on how the securities acts are to be applied
to the other newer forms of bank securities activities. 87
As a result, the SEC has taken a tentative approach to regulation
in this area. In 1970, before Camp, the SEC asserted its regulatory
authority over a proposal by First National City Bank (Citibank) to
create a special investment advisory service for individual investors who would invest at least $25,000. Under the plan, the investor
gave Citibank discretion through power of attorney to place orders
for his account with Merrill Lynch, which kept custody of the
securities invested for the participating accounts. Despite the fact
that the investment advisory service was represented as an individual portfolio management service, the SEC brought an action
for injunctive relief. The theory, an application of the ''two entity"
approach, was that the substantial parallelism in investing showed
that in reality the special investment advisory service was itself an
investment company, and that the units of participation were securities subject to registration under the federal securities laws.
Citibank entered into a consent decree and abandoned the service
without admitting or denying the validity of the SEC's position. 88
Despite this initial assertion of authority, in the years since
Camp the SEC has largely avoided direct regulation, not only of
individual portfolio management services, but also of AIS plans
and dividend reinvestment plans. In 1973, the SEC issued a "no
action" letter regarding an AIS plan where the participants had
ownership rights over the securities. 89 In another release, the SEC
set out participant ownership criteria for exemption of dividend
reinvestment plans from registration. 90 However, the SEC has

85 See · note 33 supra. This theory was first developed by the SEC in connection with
investment fund activities of insurance companies. See Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335
(1963), affd, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S-. 953 (1964).
86 See note 33 supra.
.
81See Address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before the National Trust Conference,
Feb. 4, 1974, rptd. at [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,641.
88 SEC v. First Nat'! City Bank, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH),I
92,592 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970). Subsequent to this, the SEC staff agreed to permit Citibank
to offer its small account portfolio management service without registration as long as the
bank exercises no investment discretion. Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at
198 (staff study outline). In 1974, the SEC announced that it would publish guidelines on the
problems raised by these services. Sec. Act Rel. No. 5491, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,767 (Apr. 30, 1974). Nonetheless, no further position has been
taken by the SEC.
89 lnvestment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,41 I.
••see Lucky Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),I 79,903.
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announced its refusal to issue additional "no action" letters 91 and,
not surprisingly, has taken the position that the general antifraud
provisions of the securities acts are applicable to these interests. 92
The SEC has also demonstrated caution in its approach to regulation of newer forms of collective trusts maintained by banks in
connection with retirement and profit-sharing plans. House Resolution IO (Keogh) plans, established by Congress to allow selfemployed individuals to establish tax-qualified retirement plans, 93
are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193494 and the Investment Company Act of
1940, 95 but are subject to registration under the Securities. Act of
1933, unless the SEC determines that exemption of such interests
would be appropriate. 96 The SEC has.not yet formulated a general
policy for these plans and has issued "no action" letters on an ad
hoc basis. Most banks establishing such plans, however, are relying on the intrastate offering exemption of section 3(a)(l l) of the
1933 Act97 to avoid registration. 98
The SEC has also failed to provide effective protection for individual retirement accounts (IRA's), which can be offered by banks
under section 2OO2(b) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 99 IRA's and collective investment funds for
IRA's are not exempt under either section 3(c)(l 1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940100 or section 3(a)(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 101 because they are not trusts as described under
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. Despite this, the SEC
has issued "no action" letters to banks stating that registration will
not be required under either act if the IRA participants direct
investment of their assets into individual bank savings accounts or
if the plans are funded by mutual fund shares or exempted securities.102 The SEC has thus chosen to ignore the "two entity"
approach in this area.
Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 152 (response of SEC).
lnvestment Data Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 79,411.
93 Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809(Oct. 10, 1962), amending section 401(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code ..
94 See note 78 supra.
95 See note 79 supra.
96 See note 75 supra.
97 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(II) (1970).
98 Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 161 (response of the SEC).
99 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1381 (1975). Section 2002(b) added section 408 to the Internal
Revenue Code, creating a new form of tax sheltered retirement medium for individuals not
covered by qualified or governmental pension plans or tax sheltered annuities. 26 U.S.C. §
408 (Supp. V 1975).
100 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I I) (1970).
101 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970).
102 Investment Co. Institute, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH.) ,i
80,018 (1974); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 80,411.
91

92

Journal of Law Reform

18

[VOL. 10:1

In addition, the SEC has hesitated to assert any authority over
other securities-related powers which banks have assumed in the
last several years. Banks offer investment advisory services not
only to corporate pension and profit-sharing plans qualified under
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, but also to investment
companies and real estate investment trusts. The exclusion of
banks and bank holding companies from the definition of "investment adviser" under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940103
exempts them from regulation under that act, and the SEC has not
attempted to use the "two entity" theory to extend regulation to
these new forms of advisory activities. 104 Bank underwriting activities are subject only to the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws despite the recent expansion of this type of activity . 105 The
SEC has only been given authority to study 106 the exemption of
banks from the definition of broker and dealer, 107 although, under
the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, the municipal securities
activities of banks are now subject to regulation, and dealer banks
or their separately identifiable departments are required to register
as "municipal securities dealers." 108
D.

A Summary View of the Impact
of the Camp Decision

The events of the past five years show that Camp has had an
unexpected impact. The Supreme Court's attempt to breathe new
life into the Glass-Steagall Act and to restrict bank securities activities has been a well-intentioned failure unnecessarily complicating the search for solutions to the problems they present. The
unsupportable distinction, between banks' collective management
of funds held for a fiduciary purpose and those funds received for
an investment purpose, has become embedded in the GlassSteagall Act. An inefficient case-by-case adjudication process is
being used to test newer forms of bank securities activities against
the Glass-Steagall Act limitations:Having been given no guidance
as to the extent of its regulatory jurisdiction and the validity of the
103 15 U .S.C. § 8Ob-2(a)(I I) (1970).
10•1n theory the use of the "two entity" approach is possible be~ause nonba~k s~bsidiaries of banks and bank holding companies are not exempt. In its recent leg1slat1ve
proposals on the Investment Advisers Act, the SEC merely asked for authority to study the
possibility of eliminating the bank exclusion. See Investment Advisers Act Release No. 491,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 80,341.
105See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
•06 Securities · Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7(c), 89 Stat. 111 (to be
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(e}).
107See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
.
• 08 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §,3, 89 Stat. 97 (to be codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(3O)).
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"two entity" theory, the SEC has understandably vacillated in
asserting regulatory authority in this area. A definitive solution to
these problems, which can come only from Congress, has been
delayed by the Camp decision because of unnecessary confusion
as to the real issues involved: the continuing validity of the policies
of separation enacted in 1933 through the Glass-Steagall Act, and
the extent to which the SEC, as opposed to the bank supervisory
agencies, should be given regulatory jurisdiction in this area.
III.

REEXAMINATION OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
RESTRICTIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE SEC IN
CONTEXT: THE REFORM OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A.

The Narrow Scope of the Response in Congress

The increasing number and variety of bank securities activities
have caused Congress to begin a review of the Glass-Steagall Act
restrictions on bank's and the need for additional regulation. The
congressional study is being conducted by the Subcommittee ori
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs (the Williams Subcommittee). 109 No definitive solution has yet been advanced, but the subcommittee has published a
"study outline" 110 setting out the scope of its review and has held
hearings on the issues involved. The inqui_ry is focusing upon the
exploration of public policy questions underlying the entry of
commercial banks into the securities field without a broad reexamination of the basic limitations and underlying policy of the GlassSteagall Act. 111 Most of the policy issues have been developed
through the competing arguments of the two principal antagonists
involved-the commercial banking and the securities-investment
company industries.
The methodology of the study is to weigh each newer form of
bank securities activity against several competing policy considerations. On the one hand, the banking industry argues that permitting broad bank securities activities will benefit the consumer, the
capital markets, and the economy. The consumer would benefit
from increased competition with the investment company industry,
109The chainnan of this subcommittee is Harrison A. Williams, Jr. In addition, separate
studies of this same problem are being conducted by the SEC and the Department of the
Treasury. See Sec, Act. Rel. No. 5491, supra note 88; DEP T OF THE TREASURY ISSUES
PAPER, supra note 26.
110 suecOMM. ON SECURITIES, SENATE COMM. "oN BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., !ST SESS. THE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS,
STUDY OUTLINE (Comm. Print 1975).
"'Id. at iv (introduction by Senator Williams).
0
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and banks would be able to provide small investors with the financial money management services that are now available only to
large entities through economies of scale from pooling. 112 Allowing
bank competition in the underwriting of government revenue
bonds would drive down prices for this service.11 3 The expansion
of banks' securities services would also increase total investment
in the securities markets, would provide financial benefits for the
brokerage community executing the transactions on behalf of
banks, and would increase liquidity .11 4 Conflicts of interest and
unequal regulation could be ameliorated through increased regulatory powers granted particularly to the bank supervisory agencies. Bank supervision and disclosure would be adequate to prevent both financial difficulties and concentration of economic
power. Because banking is already highly competitive, the regional
banks would enjoy the greater portion of any growth of power
involved. 115
On the other hand, the investment company and securities industries emphasize competing policy considerations. They argue that
banks enjoy freedom from regulation 116 because the bank supervisory agencies are largely captives of the banking industry, 117 and
that the competition from bank securities activities is unfair because banks use their economic power and relationships with customers to gain securities business.U 8 They foresee failures of investment banking and securities firms, concentration of economic
power, and a further institutionalization of the securities markets,
all exacerbating the trend toward creation of a ''two tier'' market in
which stocks of larger companies trade at higher multiples of
earnings than do stocks of smaller companies. 119 They contend
that regulation will not prevent conflicts of interest, and that banks
will be tempted to skew their loan policies in favor of portfolio
companies. 120 They also fear that regulation will not prevent banks
from making profits on the "float"-uninvested customer cash

112Set Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 283-85.(statement of Ray F.
Myers on behalf of the American Bankers Association).
113/d. at 285-86.
114/d. at 342-44 (testimony of Charles W. Buek, Chairman of the Board, United States
Trust Company).
115/d. at 338-39 (Buek's testimony), 288-90 (Myers' statement).
116/d. at 308-12, 316.
117/d. at 307.
118/d. at 313-16 (statement of Robert L. Augenblick on behalf of the Investment Company
Institute).
119/d. at 318.
120/d. at 263-68 (written statement of the Securities Industry Association).
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that is deposited in noninterest bearing accounts with the commercial side of the bank. 121
By posing the issues in this narrow framework, the Williams
Subcommittee and the supervisory agencies have obviously· become embroiled in an unanswerable dilemma. Their deliberations
are circumscribed by the competing, self-interested arguments of
two hostile interest groups. This type of study with the issues
framed as narrowly as they are can only produce a small-minded
legislative compromise permitting a modicum of bank securities
activity coupled with increased regulation by the SEC and the bank
supervisory agencies.
Instead of refusing to reconsider the line of separation drawn by
the Glass-Steagall Act between banks and investment banking and
defining the issues narrowly in terms of whether the newer forms of
bank securities activities should be permitted, the primary focus
should be on a reexamination of the policy basis of the GlassSteagall Act separation and the validity of the Supreme Court's
analysis in Camp. Another important emphasis should be in considering how to deal with bank securities activities in the context of
the need for reform of financial institutions.
B. The Basis of a Solution: the Separation
of Trust Departments from Commercial Banks

The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933 in response to
specific abuses that contributed to the collapse of the banking
system subsequent to the 1929 stock market crash. 122 At that time
banks were heavily engaged through affiliates in underwriting and
dealing in securities. Senator Carter Glass and his subcommittee
documented the dangers of bank involvement in the trading and
ownership of securities. Banks unwisely loaned money to their
securities affiliates, made loans to investors so they could purchase
stock from affiliates, and offered loans to portfolio companies as
well as to corporations that agreed to use bank affiliates as underwriters. Larger banks pressured regional correspondent banks to
promote their securities business, and affiliates were used to manipulate the bank's own stock and to hide bad bank investments by
shifting them to affiliates. 123 Underlying the legislative solution of

/d. at 320 (statement of Robert L. Augenblick).
See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
123 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71, supra note 12, at 1064.
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restrictions on bank securities activ1ties was the conviction of
Senator Glass that intensive participation by banks in the securities
markets, especially through the use of their depositary assets,
exaggerates financial and business fluctuations, ultimately undermining the stability of the economic organization of the country . 124
However, the problems of 1933 have. given way to newer concerns not present at that time. The most important of these is the
economic power of bank trust departments. The Glass-Steagall Act
did not disturb the established trust department activities of banks
as a point of contact with the securities markets because trust
department structure and policy was characterized by the personal
trust function involving a large number of relatively small personal
trust accounts, each of which had to be given individual attention.
Conservative investment policies emphasized avoidance of risk
and preservation of the principal. 125
Although this still accurately describes many bank trust departments, large commercial banks have in recent years established
trust departments managing billions of dollars in collective
employee benefit and advisory trust accounts. There are tax and
other incentives to invest these funds in the stock market, and
preoccupation with performance has caused increasing use of
high-risk, high-gain securities investment opportunities. 126 At the
end of 1974, bank trust department holdings of securities amounted
to $328 billion, and recent estimates state that this has grown to
over $400 billion. 127 Most of this economic power is concentrated
in a few commercial banks. At the end of 1972, of the 3,804 bank
trust departments, only 71 had trust assets of $1 billion or more,
and 1.9 percent of bank trustees managed $292 billion in trust
assets. By contrast, 3,051 banks had trust assets of under $25
million. 128
Numerous abuses have been shown to surround the operation of
large bank trust departments. Foremost among these are problems
of conflicts of interest, such as communications of inside information between a bank's commercial department and its trust de-

/d. at 1001.
See E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 21-23.
126See id. at 23-24. State trust law concepts of the "prudent man" and even the federal
fiduciary standard established by section 1104(a)( I)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(l)(A) (1975) have been inadequate for imposing
substantive investment restrictions in the area of employee benefit plans. See Herbert,
Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17
a.c. INous. & CoM. L. REv. 127, 144-46, 156-58 (1976). Higher than expected returns from
a tax qualified pension plan directly benefit the employer, either through reduction of his
costs or direct recovery of the "surplus" upon termination of the plan. Id. at 152-53.
' 27 See note 26 supra.
128 E. HERMAN, supra note 27, at 21.
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partment. 129 There are indications that the conventional solution of
establishing a "Chinese wall" between the two departments has
not been effective. 13 ° Furthermore, larger trust departments regularly deposit so-called "uninvestible funds" from their trust departments in noninterest bearing accounts with the banks' commercial departments, turning net operating losses on trust department activities into substantial profits. 131 Large banks' trust activities also present problems of potential bank influence on or
control of portfolio companies, misuse of trust department resources to service the demands of commercial customers, possible
consideration of commercial customers' reactions to trust department decisions to buy or sell securities, and bank control of proxy
voting. 132
These problems appear to be insoluble without major structural
chariges. In 1973, a staff report by the House Committee on Banking and Currency proposed a complete separation from commercial
banks of all trust departments with trust assets in excess of $200
million. 133 This solution has been echoed by at least one former
member of the Federal Reserve Board. 134 The proposal has appeal
not only because it would ameliorate the problems of large commercial banks and their trust departments; it would also provide
12 •:See generally Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the
"Wall," 14 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 21 (1972); Lybecker, Regulation of Ban.k Trust
Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps; Eight Remedies (pt. I), 2 SEC. REG. L.J.
122 (1974); E. HERMAN, supra note 27.
' 3 0'fhe "Chinese wall" is· the solution proposed by the Hunt Commission, supra note 3. It
relies on a body of rules and procedures adopted by the bank to regulate the flow of
information between its trust and commercial departments. For criticism of the "wall"
solution, see Herman & Safanda, supra note 129; Lybecker, supra note 70, at 983-84;
Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1372 (1974).
However, the wall seems to pose an unresolvable dilemma in the case where a bank comes
into possession of inside information about a 'corporation as a result of its commercial
banking activities and the trust department is trading or recommending the corporation's
securities. If the "wall" prevents the transmission of information, the bank may be held
liable for the trust department's ignoring the information in the possession of the commercial
side of the business. See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH),I 94,329 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 2, 1974), remanded without resolution
for further factual findings, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
131 1n 1974, the ten largest trust departments in New York City had an aggregate operating
loss of $40.5 million, but this became a net profit of $141. 7 million after they received credit
for trust department funds which had been deposited with their credit departments. Se-·
curities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 147 (statement of Roderick M. Hills,
Chairman of the SEC). See also Lybecker, supra note 129, at 138-43.
132 E.· HERMAN, supra note 27, at 30-72. Preliminary indications are that problems of
disclosure, substantive controls on investment, and prevention of conflicts of interest are
not adequately addressed in the new Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See
Herbert, supra note 126, at 166-67.
133 STAFF OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., FINANCIAL INSTUTUTIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 98-101 (Comm. Print 1973). To be most effective, a totaf separation of trust and
commercial activities into unaffiliated entities should be required.
134 Securities Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 9-10 (testimony of Jeffrey M.
Bucher).
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the cornerstone for a solution to the overall problem of banks'
securities activities in the context of reform of financial institutions.
If this separation were a part of the line of demarcation drawn by
the Glass-Steagall Act, the resulting trust companies could be
allowed, under appropriate regulatory constraints, to extend their
securities-related activities and to enter freely into competition
with the investment company and securities industries by offering
commingled investment accounts·, investment advice, and even
· underwriting services. Consumers and small investors would benefit from increased competition and would gain the benefit of
money management services that have long been available to wealthy investors. The dangers of market domination would be removed, and equality of opportunity in the marketplace would be
achieved through severance of the connection of trust departments
with commercial banking. It has been predicted that many large
trust departments would fail without the benefit of their tie to
commercial banks, 135 but this does not take into account the increased economic opportunities they would have by permitting
them to engage broadly in securities activities. Furthermore, if the
present structure of trust fees is so low that bank trust departments
are unprofitable, it must mean that trust department customers are
not paying the true marginal costs of service but are receiving
subsidies from commercial banking customers. Continuation of
this inequity cannot be a good argument against separation. 136
C.

The Dispute Over Regulatory Jurisdiction

Separating trust departments from commercial banks would also
be the basis for resolving the problem of regulatory jurisdiction
between the SEC and the bank supervisory agencies. The present
situation, without separation, presents an insoluble regulatory
puzzle. While the SEC, in carrying out its mission of protecting
investors, seeks increased disclosure from banks of their trust
Lybecker, supra note 70, at 1001.
Verkuil, supra note 130, at 1371-72. Moreover, allowing trust companies to compete
freely with investment companies and securities firms should be accompanied by measures
to allow mutual fund complexes, insurance companies, and brokerage and investment
advisory firms to compete for the employee pension fund business. Tax law restrictions
preventing these entities from serving as trustees or custodians for qualified retirement
funds should be eliminated. Under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, brokerage and·
investment companies, investment advisors, and insurance companies are not permitted to
be trustees or custodians of qualified retirement funds. However, the Employment Income
Securities Act of 1974 amended § 401(f) of the I.R.C. to permit persons other than banks,
upon designation by the Secretary of the Treasury-, to be appointed trustee for § 403(b)
custodial accounts and for§ 408(a) Individual Retirement Accounts. 26 U.S.C. § 40I(f)(2)
(Supp. V 1975).
135
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department activities, the bank supervisory agencies, whose task is
primarily to safeguard the financial solvency of banks, view disclosure as causing needless concern over the financial stability of
major banks. 137 The banking agencies thus are resisting the SEC's
assertion of jurisdiction over banks' trust department activities.
This regulatory conflict would be reduced by separation,.giving the
SEC the authority to subject the new trust companies to the same
disclosure and substantive regulatory requirements as other vehicles for pooled investment without conflicting or overlapping with
the jurisdiction of bank supervisory agencies.
Disclosure to investor-participants in the various types of trust
department collective investment funds is beginning to be recognized as a major problem. Concern is especially acute with regard
to employer-funded pension plans. In the recent case of Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 138 the court denied a
motion to dismiss an action brought by an employee under section
lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and
section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act against the trustees of a
union-managed pension fund. The court not only found an interest
in a pension fund to be a "security," but also held that the transfer
of the interest was a "sale" 139 under the securities laws despite the
fact that the pension fund was both "involuntary" and "noncontributory" in the sense that it was funded solely by employer
contributions and that participants came under the plan automatically by reason of their employment without any choice on their
part. In coming to this conclusion, the court rejected the long
established SEC position that there is no sale in the absence of
individual choice or contribution, 140 finding that this position
"comports neither to logic nor economic reality. " 141 More significantly, the court also considered whether, as a matter of policy,
there was a need for disclosure in view of the significant body of
special legislation enacted by Congress to govern pension fund
management. It found a need for disclosure under the securities
laws because of the more limited purpose of the pension legislation. "It is significant to note that this entire body of pension
legislation is concerned with administration of such funds, so as to
protect the interests of its participants, rather than regulation of
circumstances of entry into the plan." 142
See note 6 supra.
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 95,453 (N.0. Ill., Mar. I,
1976).
139 The term "sale" is defined as a "disposition ofa security ... for value." 15 U.S.C. §
77b(3) (1970).
140See Opinion of the Assistant General Counsel of the SEC, [1941] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 11 2105.50
141 Daniel, supra note 138, at 99,297.
' 42 /d. at 99,294.
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Although this case involved a union-managed pension fund, its
significance extends to trust department collective investment vehicles as well. Daniel not only confirms the possibility of IOb-5
liability, but also indicates the need for giving adequate information
to potential participants at the time of entry into the fund. At this
point the bank examination process is no substitute for disclosure.
Disclosing adequate information should be accomplished, not by
relying on the general antifraud provisions of the securities laws,
but by subjecting trust department collective investment vehicles
and securities activities to the same SEC regulations that apply to
similar activities of the investment company and securities industry.
D.

The Relation to Reform of Financial Institutions

Separation of trust departments from large commercial banks as
a solution to problems of bank securities activities is also consistent with recent proposals for reform of financial institutions. The
same considerations supporting the reform movement directed toward removing barriers to competition between banks and thrift
institutions in the area of commercial banking in order to assure a
more stable supply of credit 143 indicate that the consuming public
would also benefit from more competition in the area of collective
trust funds and pooled investment opportunities. Just as separation
of large trust departments from commercial banks is necessary to
assure competitive equality in the marketplace between thrift institutions and commercial banks, 144 separation is also necessary
for effective competition in the collective investment fund and
pension fund area. Moreover, the removal of bank supervisory
agencies from regulatory responsibility for banks' collective investment funds should simplify the problems involved in consolidating and streamlining the present tripartite bank regulatory
system into one federal bank supervisory agency . 145

IV. CONCLlJSION
The recent increase in the types and amount of bank securities
activities has caused the Senate Securities Subcommittee, the
SEC, and the Department of the Treasury to undertake a review of
the public policy implications involved. Two major questions are
See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
See Verkuil, supra note 130, at 1366-67.
145 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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involved: (l) whether any or all of the activities in question should
be prohibited through amendment of the Banking Act of 1933 (the
Glass-Steagall Act), and (2) what form of regulation by the SEC
and the bank supervisory agencies is appropriate for those activities that are not wholly prohibited.
All three studies· have taken a relatively narrow approach to the
problem, accepting the basic prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act
and the analysis of the Supreme Court in Investment Company
Institute v. Camp as largely beyond the scope of their inquiry.
They have also defined the issues involved merely in terms of the
competing arguments of the primary industry interest groups
involved-the commercial banks and investment companies.
A more appropriate line of inquiry would be to wholly reevaluate
the Camp decision as well as the line of separation drawn between
banks and investment banking by the Glass-Steagall Act in light of
the problems presented by all bank securities activities and in the
context of reform of financial institutions. Such a reconsideration
compels the conclusion that the Supreme Court in Camp was
incorrect, at least in terms of policy, in its conclusion that bank
trust department securities activities do not present the same dangers as bank commingled investment funds. On the contrary, conflicts of interest and other problems are inherent in large banks'
trust department activities, and the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions
should be replaced by a separation of large bank trust departments
from their commercial departments.
This separation offunctions would have several salutary effects.
It would remove the present competitive advantages and potential
for market domination by large banks as well as the conflicts of
interest that are inherent problems in the union of a bank's commercial and trust department activities. Greater competition would
be injected into the marketplace if trust departments were allowed
the freedom to compete and were subjected to the same regulation
in their securities activities as investment companies and securities
firms. Regulatory conflicts between the SEC and the bank supervisory agencies would also be more easily resolved. These considerations suggest that Congress has been far too timid in coming to
grips with these problems and that a much broader approach is
necessary in order to deal adequately with bank securities activities.

